慶應総合政策 2015 II フレーズ・解説
原文はこちら
1→強制することだけが「power」ではない。
It is a mistake
to think that
power consists of just ordering others to change.
power 「権力」
order O to do 「Oに～しろと命ずる」
You can affect their behavior
by shaping their preferences
[31](I. so 2. in ways 3. such)
that produce what you want
rather than relying on carrots and sticks
to change their behavior
when "push comes to shove."
by doing 「～することによって」
so that S V 「～ように」
in ways that 「～（する）方法」←thatは関係代名詞
Sometimes
you can get the outcomes〔you want〕
without pushing or shoving.
Ignoring this dimension
by using too narrow a definition of power
can lead to a poorly shaped foreign policy.
too 形容詞 a 名詞「あまりにも～な...」
lead to「～につながる」
this dimension→powerは「押しつける」だけではない、ということ。
In my opinion, there are three aspects of power.
2→powerの第１の側面＝強制（coercion）
The first aspect, or "face," of power
was defined by Yale political scientist Robert Dahl
in studies of New Haven in the 1950s,
or「つまり、いわば」
and it is widely used today
[32](1. even though 2. as long as 3. so that) it covers only part of power behavior.
This face of power focuses on the ability
to get others to act
in ways that are [33](1. in favor of 2. similar to 3. contrary to) their initial preferences and strategies.
get O to do「Oに～させる」
[33]→この文章は「権力がどう人を変えるか」というテーマなので。。。
To measure or judge power,
you have to know
how strong another person's or nation's initial preferences were
and how much they were changed by [34](l. their 2. your 3. its) efforts.
Coercion can be quite clear
in a situation
in which there appears to be some degree of choice.
If a man〔holding a gun [35](1. on 2. with 3. about) you〕says,
"Your money or your life,"
you have some choice,
but it is small
and not consistent with your initial preferences.
3→the second face of power = 「agenda-setting（そもそもの計画）のlegitimacy（適切さ）」自体に働きかける。つまり相手が何かしようとしているときに「君たちがそうしようとしてる計画自体が不適切なんだ」と思わせることによって相手の行動を変えるということ。
In the 1960s,
shortly after Dahl developed his widely accepted definition,
political scientists Peter Bacbrach and Morton Baratz
pointed out that
Dahl’s definition [36](1. emphasized 2. added 3. missed)
what they called the "second face of power."
Dahl ignored
the dimension of framing and agenda-setting.
If ideas and institutions can be used
to frame the agenda for action
in a way
that makes others' preferences seem irrelevant or [37] (1. to the end 2. without limit3. out of bounds),
then it may never be necessary
to push or shove them.
In other words,
it may be possible
to shape others' preferences
by [38](1. betraying 2. affecting 3. answering)
their expectations of what is legitimate or feasible.
Agenda-framing focuses on
the ability to keep issues off the table.
→agenda-framing、つまり「そもそもの計画(agenda)の正当性(legitimacy)」に働きかけるので、「今目に見えているissuesをoff the table（いったん脇に）置かせる」ということになる。
4→the second face of power (=agenda-setting)の具体例
Powerful actors can make sure that
the less powerful are never invited to the table,
or if they get there,
the rules of the game have already been set
by those who arrived first.
actor「当事者、関係者」
International financial policy had this characteristic,
at least before the crisis of 2008 [39](1. earned things over 2. took things in 3. opened things up) somewhat
when the Group of 8 (G8) was supplemented by the Group of 20 (G20).
Those who are subject to this second face of power
may or may not be aware of it.
If they accept
the legitimacy of the institutions or the social discourse
〔that framed the agenda〕,
they may not feel unduly constrained by the second face of power.
But if the agenda of action is
[40](1. contrary to 2. constrained by 3. immune to) threats of coercion or promises of payments,
then it is just an instance of the first face of power.
The target's acquiescence in the legitimacy of the agenda
is what makes this face of power co-optive and partly constitutive of soft power
―the ability to get what you want
by the co-optive means of framing the agenda,
persuading, and eliciting positive attraction.
5 → the third face of power = 相手の「好み」自体を変えてしまう。
Still later, in the 1970s,
sociologist Steven Lukes pointed out that
ideas and beliefs also help shape others' initial preferences.
In Dahl’s approach,
I can exercise power over you
by getting you to do
what you would [41 ](1. otherwise 2. publicly 3. involuntarily) not want to do;
in other words,
by changing your situation,
I can make you change your preferred strategy.
But I can also exercise power over you
by determining your very wants.
I can shape your basic or initial preferences,
not merely change the situation
in a way
that makes you change your strategy
for achieving your preferences.
6→ the third face of powerの具体例
This dimension of power is missed by Dahl's definition.
A teenage boy may carefully choose a fashionable shirt
to wear to school
to attract a girl,
but the teenager may not be aware that
the reason the shirt is so fashionable
is that a national retailer recently launched a major advertising campaign.
Both his preference and that of the other teenagers
[42]( 1. have been 2. should have been 3. had been being) formed
by an unseen actor〔who has shaped the structure of preferences〕.
If you can get others
to want the same outcomes〔that you want〕,
it will not be necessary
to [43](1. analyze 2, follow 3. override) their initial desires.
Lukes called this the "third face of power."
7→the secondとthe thirdに関する注意点
There are critical questions of voluntarism
in determining how freely people choose their preferences.
in doing「～する際に、～するという点において」
Not all soft power looks so soft to outside critics.
In some extreme cases,
it is difficult
to ascertain what constitutes voluntary formation of preferences.
For instance,
in the "Stockholm syndrome,"
victims of kidnapping〔who suffered traumatic stress〕
begin to identify with their abductors.
identify with 「～に親近感を持つ、～と自分を同一視する」
But in some situations,
it is more difficult
to be certain of others' interests.
Are Afghan women [44]( 1. depressed 2. impressed 3. oppressed)
when they choose to wear a burka?
What about women
who choose to wear a veil in democratic France?
Sometimes
it is difficult to know the extent of voluntarism
from mere outward appearances.
To the extent that force creates a sense of awe〔that attracts others〕,
it can be an indirect source of co-optive power,
but if the force is directly coercive,
then it is simply an instance of the first face of power.
8→the second とthe thirdのまとめ→structural power
Some theorists have called these
the public, hidden, and invisible faces of power,
[45](1. reflecting 2. maximizing 3. increasing) the degrees of difficulty
that the target has
in discovering the source of power.
The second and third faces embody aspects of structural power.
A structure is simply an arrangement of all the parts of a whole.
Humans [46](1. make up for 2. are embedded in 3. keep out of) complex structures
of culture, social relations,
and power〔that affect and constrain them〕.
A person's field of action is "delimited
by actors〔with whom he has no interaction or communication〕,
by actions distant in time and space,
by actions〔of which he is, in no explicit sense, the target." 〕
Some exercises of power
reflect the intentional decisions of particular actors,
whereas others are the product of unintended consequences and large social forces.
some ..., others ...「...のもあれば、...のもある」
others = other exercises of power
9→外交におけるthe second / the thirdの重要性について
In global politics,
some goals that states seek
are more [47](1. susceptible to 2. valuable to 3. comfortable with) the second and third
than to the first face of power.
Arnold Wolfers once distinguished
between what he called "possession goals"
―specific and often tangible objectives―
and "milieu goals,"
which are often structural and intangible.
For example,
access to resources or a trade agreement is a possession goal,
whereas promoting an open trade system, free markets, democracy, or human rights
is a milieu goal.
Focusing solely on [48] (1. command power 2. intangible power 3. social power)
, the first face of power,
may mislead us about how to promote such goals.
10→powerを３点から考えるべき理由
The reason not to collapse all three faces of power into the first
is that
doing so diminishes attention to networks
, which are an important type of structural power
in the twenty-first century.
Networks are becoming increasingly important
in an information age,
and positioning in social networks
can be an important power resource.
For example,
in a hub-and-spokes network,
power can derive from being the hub of communication.
If you communicate with your other friends through me,
that gives me power.
If the points [49](1. at the front 2. in the domain 3. on the rim)
are not directly connected to each other,
their dependence on communication through the hub
can shape their agenda.
Political theorist Hannah Arendt once said that
"power springs up among men when they act together."
Similarly,
a state can [50](1. devise 2. wield 3. lodge) global power
by engaging and acting together with other states,
not merely acting against them.
1→強制することだけが「power」ではない。
It is a mistake
to think that
power consists of just ordering others to change.
power 「権力」
order O to do 「Oに～しろと命ずる」
You can affect their behavior
by shaping their preferences
[31](I. so 2. in ways 3. such)
that produce what you want
rather than relying on carrots and sticks
to change their behavior
when "push comes to shove."
by doing 「～することによって」
so that S V 「～ように」
in ways that 「～（する）方法」←thatは関係代名詞
Sometimes
you can get the outcomes〔you want〕
without pushing or shoving.
Ignoring this dimension
by using too narrow a definition of power
can lead to a poorly shaped foreign policy.
too 形容詞 a 名詞「あまりにも～な...」
lead to「～につながる」
this dimension→powerは「押しつける」だけではない、ということ。
In my opinion, there are three aspects of power.
2→powerの第１の側面＝強制（coercion）
The first aspect, or "face," of power
was defined by Yale political scientist Robert Dahl
in studies of New Haven in the 1950s,
or「つまり、いわば」
and it is widely used today
[32](1. even though 2. as long as 3. so that) it covers only part of power behavior.
This face of power focuses on the ability
to get others to act
in ways that are [33](1. in favor of 2. similar to 3. contrary to) their initial preferences and strategies.
get O to do「Oに～させる」
[33]→この文章は「権力がどう人を変えるか」というテーマなので。。。
To measure or judge power,
you have to know
how strong another person's or nation's initial preferences were
and how much they were changed by [34](l. their 2. your 3. its) efforts.
Coercion can be quite clear
in a situation
in which there appears to be some degree of choice.
If a man〔holding a gun [35](1. on 2. with 3. about) you〕says,
"Your money or your life,"
you have some choice,
but it is small
and not consistent with your initial preferences.
3→the second face of power = 「agenda-setting（そもそもの計画）のlegitimacy（適切さ）」自体に働きかける。つまり相手が何かしようとしているときに「君たちがそうしようとしてる計画自体が不適切なんだ」と思わせることによって相手の行動を変えるということ。
In the 1960s,
shortly after Dahl developed his widely accepted definition,
political scientists Peter Bacbrach and Morton Baratz
pointed out that
Dahl’s definition [36](1. emphasized 2. added 3. missed)
what they called the "second face of power."
Dahl ignored
the dimension of framing and agenda-setting.
If ideas and institutions can be used
to frame the agenda for action
in a way
that makes others' preferences seem irrelevant or [37] (1. to the end 2. without limit3. out of bounds),
then it may never be necessary
to push or shove them.
In other words,
it may be possible
to shape others' preferences
by [38](1. betraying 2. affecting 3. answering)
their expectations of what is legitimate or feasible.
Agenda-framing focuses on
the ability to keep issues off the table.
→agenda-framing、つまり「そもそもの計画(agenda)の正当性(legitimacy)」に働きかけるので、「今目に見えているissuesをoff the table（いったん脇に）置かせる」ということになる。
4→the second face of power (=agenda-setting)の具体例
Powerful actors can make sure that
the less powerful are never invited to the table,
or if they get there,
the rules of the game have already been set
by those who arrived first.
actor「当事者、関係者」
International financial policy had this characteristic,
at least before the crisis of 2008 [39](1. earned things over 2. took things in 3. opened things up) somewhat
when the Group of 8 (G8) was supplemented by the Group of 20 (G20).
Those who are subject to this second face of power
may or may not be aware of it.
If they accept
the legitimacy of the institutions or the social discourse
〔that framed the agenda〕,
they may not feel unduly constrained by the second face of power.
But if the agenda of action is
[40](1. contrary to 2. constrained by 3. immune to) threats of coercion or promises of payments,
then it is just an instance of the first face of power.
The target's acquiescence in the legitimacy of the agenda
is what makes this face of power co-optive and partly constitutive of soft power
―the ability to get what you want
by the co-optive means of framing the agenda,
persuading, and eliciting positive attraction.
5 → the third face of power = 相手の「好み」自体を変えてしまう。
Still later, in the 1970s,
sociologist Steven Lukes pointed out that
ideas and beliefs also help shape others' initial preferences.
In Dahl’s approach,
I can exercise power over you
by getting you to do
what you would [41 ](1. otherwise 2. publicly 3. involuntarily) not want to do;
in other words,
by changing your situation,
I can make you change your preferred strategy.
But I can also exercise power over you
by determining your very wants.
I can shape your basic or initial preferences,
not merely change the situation
in a way
that makes you change your strategy
for achieving your preferences.
6→ the third face of powerの具体例
This dimension of power is missed by Dahl's definition.
A teenage boy may carefully choose a fashionable shirt
to wear to school
to attract a girl,
but the teenager may not be aware that
the reason the shirt is so fashionable
is that a national retailer recently launched a major advertising campaign.
Both his preference and that of the other teenagers
[42]( 1. have been 2. should have been 3. had been being) formed
by an unseen actor〔who has shaped the structure of preferences〕.
If you can get others
to want the same outcomes〔that you want〕,
it will not be necessary
to [43](1. analyze 2, follow 3. override) their initial desires.
Lukes called this the "third face of power."
7→the secondとthe thirdに関する注意点
There are critical questions of voluntarism
in determining how freely people choose their preferences.
in doing「～する際に、～するという点において」
Not all soft power looks so soft to outside critics.
In some extreme cases,
it is difficult
to ascertain what constitutes voluntary formation of preferences.
For instance,
in the "Stockholm syndrome,"
victims of kidnapping〔who suffered traumatic stress〕
begin to identify with their abductors.
identify with 「～に親近感を持つ、～と自分を同一視する」
But in some situations,
it is more difficult
to be certain of others' interests.
Are Afghan women [44]( 1. depressed 2. impressed 3. oppressed)
when they choose to wear a burka?
What about women
who choose to wear a veil in democratic France?
Sometimes
it is difficult to know the extent of voluntarism
from mere outward appearances.
To the extent that force creates a sense of awe〔that attracts others〕,
it can be an indirect source of co-optive power,
but if the force is directly coercive,
then it is simply an instance of the first face of power.
8→the second とthe thirdのまとめ→structural power
Some theorists have called these
the public, hidden, and invisible faces of power,
[45](1. reflecting 2. maximizing 3. increasing) the degrees of difficulty
that the target has
in discovering the source of power.
The second and third faces embody aspects of structural power.
A structure is simply an arrangement of all the parts of a whole.
Humans [46](1. make up for 2. are embedded in 3. keep out of) complex structures
of culture, social relations,
and power〔that affect and constrain them〕.
A person's field of action is "delimited
by actors〔with whom he has no interaction or communication〕,
by actions distant in time and space,
by actions〔of which he is, in no explicit sense, the target." 〕
Some exercises of power
reflect the intentional decisions of particular actors,
whereas others are the product of unintended consequences and large social forces.
some ..., others ...「...のもあれば、...のもある」
others = other exercises of power
9→外交におけるthe second / the thirdの重要性について
In global politics,
some goals that states seek
are more [47](1. susceptible to 2. valuable to 3. comfortable with) the second and third
than to the first face of power.
Arnold Wolfers once distinguished
between what he called "possession goals"
―specific and often tangible objectives―
and "milieu goals,"
which are often structural and intangible.
For example,
access to resources or a trade agreement is a possession goal,
whereas promoting an open trade system, free markets, democracy, or human rights
is a milieu goal.
Focusing solely on [48] (1. command power 2. intangible power 3. social power)
, the first face of power,
may mislead us about how to promote such goals.
10→powerを３点から考えるべき理由
The reason not to collapse all three faces of power into the first
is that
doing so diminishes attention to networks
, which are an important type of structural power
in the twenty-first century.
Networks are becoming increasingly important
in an information age,
and positioning in social networks
can be an important power resource.
For example,
in a hub-and-spokes network,
power can derive from being the hub of communication.
If you communicate with your other friends through me,
that gives me power.
If the points [49](1. at the front 2. in the domain 3. on the rim)
are not directly connected to each other,
their dependence on communication through the hub
can shape their agenda.
Political theorist Hannah Arendt once said that
"power springs up among men when they act together."
Similarly,
a state can [50](1. devise 2. wield 3. lodge) global power
by engaging and acting together with other states,
not merely acting against them.
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